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This paper has as objective to review some consequences of understanding EU law as the law of an 
integrated legal order. It does so in order to foster an understanding of EU public law beyond the 
traditional concepts of the EU as a quasi federal system or merely a refined international 
organization, a constitutional or an administrative legal order. This paper’s objective is to initiate 
some reflection on what might be a step beyond imagining EU public law from traditional 
perspectives. It is a piece of work in progress, a contribution to on ongoing debate and reflection. 
 
Introduction to the Problematique 
 
Grossly simplified, one could apply two traditional perspectives to EU public law: A constitutional 
and an administrative perspective. These two can be used as examples to highlight two different 
aspects of EU integration through law. Looking at EU law from a perspective of administrative law, 
one might conclude that it contains procedural approaches for the integration of initially 
organizationally separate actors in order to achieve the goals of EU policies.2 The constitutional 
                                                 
1  Herwig C.H. Hofmann is Professor of European and Transnational Public Law and Director of the Centre for 
European Law at the University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg. (herwig.hofmann@uni.lu). 
2  See H.C.H. Hofmann, A. Türk, The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences, 13 
European Law Journal [2007], 253-271. Pressing questions arising from that perspective are thus very much oriented 
towards achieving transparency of procedures, accountability of actors and allocation of responsibilities within non-
hierarchic networks. An administrative perspective highlights that procedural cooperation has in many instances 
intensified so much that new actors were created. Comitology committees evolved out of a set of procedural rules for 
supervision of the Commission exercising implementing tasks. Informal networks of executive bodies became 
formalised to formal networks with decision-making powers and cooperate procedures, which then in many policy 
areas evolve to agencies.  
perspective, on the other hand, highlights questions more from a perspective of rules of conflict to 
define the relations between the EU and Member States as well as between the EU and international 
organisations. This results from rules on distribution of competences and from principles established 
to solve competence conflicts. There is of course a lively debate about the appropriate use of 
conflicts rules such as hierarchies of norms, pluralist models or deliberative-supranationalist models.   
The results of the constitutional and the administrative perspectives on EU public law could be 
discussed separately. A joint approach might on the other hand, allow taking into account that 
European integration has been based not only of establishing a legal order which was supplanted 
onto Member State law by means of constitutional conflicts rules such as supremacy and direct 
effect. It would allow acknowledging that it is equally is based on a system that actively integrates 
Member States in a system of joint exercise of public powers. Integration, one might argue with neo-
functionalist approaches was successful because it combined a system of conflicts rules with an 
increasing degree of procedural integration.3 These latter theories assume that Member States were 
capable of accepting such new legal order to which they had delegated sovereignty because they were 
actively part of the exercise of these powers. This was not completely alien to their domestic legal 
systems. Instead of constituting a loss of sovereignty as consequence of delegation, the Community 
constituted a gain for the Member States by being able to participate in the creation of policies which 
would be applicable throughout the Community. Integrated executives from this point of view have 
emerged from the fundamental needs of the Member States to link national and European 
administrations in order to maximise their problem solving capacity. The success of integration has 
been ascribed to the fact that pure intergovernmental structures would not be capable of addressing 
the joint regulatory problems of a market as integrated as the EU’s. A federal structure, on the other 
hand, would threaten the very existence of the EU member states by establishing heavy hierarchic 
structures which the member states may not be prepared to support. The evolutionary development 
of the integrated executive structure was an alternative to that choice.4 The tool to achieve this goal 
was to achieve a high degree of integration of the executive powers of the Member States into 
                                                 
3  The end of the traditional ‘binary’ approach (distinguishing for internal matters national public law from international 
public law as the law of contracts between states), is of course not only a phenomenon of European integration. 
Networks of governmental executives with private party participation for regulation and information sharing exist in 
many policy areas beyond European integration from banking and finance regulation, over environmental protection 
and other fields of Common interest. The result of such networking has been referred to as the ‘disaggregation of 
sovereignity’ and the ‘disaggregated state’. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press 
(Princeton 2004), pp. 5, 12. 
4  W. Wessels, ‘Verwaltung im EG-Mehrebenensystem: Auf dem Weg in die Megabürokratie?’, in: M. Jachtenfuchs, B. 
Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische Integration, (Opladen, 1996); W. Wessels, ‘An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic 
Macropolitical View on Integration Processes’, 35 Journal of Common Market Studies (1997) 267-299; W. Wessels, 
‘Comitology: fusion in action. Politico-administrative trends in the EU system’, 5 Journal of European Public Policy (1998) 
209-234. 
activities on the European level, in all phases of what might be referred to as the ‘policy cycle’ – the 
phases of agenda setting, rule making and policy implementation in the Community.  
Agenda setting, for example, despite being a prerogative of the Commission, is characterised by a 
high degree of cooperation and consultation of national executives. These in reality play a central role 
in shaping the Commission’s policy initiatives. The forum in which this cooperation takes place are 
expert groups which are generally composed of national civil servants as well as independent experts. 
These groups are used to develop and test ideas, build coalitions of experts and pre-determine policy 
incentives to be formally presented later by the Commission as initiative. They are arenas for 
deliberation, brainstorming and intergovernmental conflict solving and coalition building.5 
Similarly, supranational and national administrative actors exercise influence over the EU’s decision-
making process. The presence of the national administrations is felt mostly within the Council 
working parties that support COREPER. Here, the national civil servants have to balance their 
national mandate against the need to reach a consensus in pursuance of EU tasks.6 
The most obvious arena for intensive administrative cooperation and interaction, however, is the 
implementation phase. EU administrative governance in the policy phase of implementation forms 
an essential part of the exercise of public power in the EU. A wide variety of activities pursued by the 
institutions qualify as implementation - they range from single case decisions and preparatory acts 
thereof to acts of administrative rule-making and the amendment of specific provisions in legislation 
where so authorised. A wealth of structures to take implementation decisions and forms of 
implementation measures have been developed in different policy areas. Amongst these are forms of 
governance by committees (through ‘Comitology’-type and the newer ‘Lamfalussy’-type procedures), 
governance by agencies, governance by administrative networks as well as implementation by private 
parties acting as recipients of delegation. These forms of implementation structures are not mutually 
exclusive. Most policies use several of these structures in combination. The current constitutional 
framework in the EU and EC treaties only partially reflects the evolutionary development of EU 
                                                 
5  See: T. Larsson, Pre-Cooking - The World of Expert Groups, ESO Report (Stockholm 2003); J. Trondal, Re-Socialising 
Civil Servants: The Transformative Powers of EU Institutions, 39 Acta Politica International Journal of Political Science 
[2004] 4-30; T. Larsson, J. Trondal, ‘Agenda Setting in the European Commission’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A. Türk 
(eds.), EU Administrative Governance Elgar (Cheltenham 2006), 11-43; Ase Gornitzka, Ulf Sverdrup, Who Consults? 
The Configuration of Expert Groups in the European Union, 31 West European Politics 725-750. 
6  See: C. Neuhold, E. Radulova ‘The involvement of administrative players in the EU Decision Making Process’, in 
H.C.H. Hofmann and A. Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance Elgar (Cheltenham 2006), 44-73. Such interaction, 
albeit to a lesser extent, also exists through what is known as the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’(OMC). See e.g. D. 
Hodson, I. Maher, The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-
ordination, 39 Journal of Common Market Studies [2001], 719-746; I. Linsenmann, C. Meyer, Dritter Weg, Übergang oder 
Teststrecke?, 25 Integration [2002], 285-297; C. de la Porte, Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for 
Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?, 8 European Law Journal 2002, 38-58; S. Regent, The 
Open Method of Coordination: A New Supranational Form of Governance?, 9 European Law Journal [2003], 190-240). 
policy implementation,7 which has been driven by practical necessity and political arrangements 
rather than designed around any preconceived constitutional model. In reality, we have not come 
across examples for pure forms of either direct or indirect administration without existing forms of 
cooperation between the national and the EU levels. Instead, in many policy areas, the development 
of the integration of EU and national administrative proceedings has led to ‘composite proceedings’ 
to which both national and EU administrations contribute.8 Administrative cooperation between the 
national and the European levels is well documented in the relatively formalized process of 
comitology.9 The Commission occupies a central role in the implementation phase in the framework 
of an institutional arrangement, which was developed in the 1960s with subsequently codified, with 
modifications in the first and second comitology decisions of 1987 and 1999 with the 2006 
amendments.10 The Commission’s legal position in Article 202 third indent EC as presumed 
implementation authority is the expression of its functional role as Community executive.11 This 
capacity allows the Commission to exercise a degree of political judgment as to how to execute the 
Community interest in cases where implementing competences have been delegated to the 
Commission. The Commission’s margin of manoeuvre is of course limited by the involvement of 
comitology committees in the implementation process.12 The Commission’s margin of discretion in 
                                                 
7  References can be found in Articles 10, 202 and 211 EC. 
8  See the detailed analysis of this term in E. Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund  und die Rolle 
des Verwaltungsrechts’ in: Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann, Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.) Der Europäische 
Verwaltungsverbund Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen 2005) 1-23 and the contributions in E. Schmidt-Assmann, W. Hoffmann-
Riem (eds.), Strukturen des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts Nomos (Baden-Baden 1999) with further references. The 
integrated nature of composite procedures is also evident when regarding the process from the perspective of the 
EC’s obligations under international law. In the area of the denomination of geographical indications of foodstuffs 
and other products, for example, a WTO Panel reviewing a complaint against the EC took note “that there are 
various executive authorities involved in the implementation of the Regulation, including representatives of EC 
member States” and that the Commission represents all of the levels involved since (…) Community laws are 
generally not executed through authorities at Community level but rather through recourse to the authorities of its 
member States which, in such a situation, ‘act de facto as organs of the Community, for which the Community would 
be responsible under WTO law and international law in general’ WT/DS290/21/R, EC – Protection of Trademarks 
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Prodcuts and Foodstuffs, of 25/04/2005, para 7.147 and 7.148. See 
also: WT/DS301/R EC - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, of 22/04/2005 at paras 7.32 and 7.33. 
9  Even though the Commission, or on referral the Council, will adopt the final decision, the deliberation and bargaining 
between the Commission and the national administrations creates a framework within which multilevel actors can 
find mutually agreeable solutions. 
10  Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission, [1987] OJ L 197/33 and Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures 
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, [1999] OJ L 184/23. Decision 
2006/512/EC, OJ 2006 L /11. For a discussion of this pre-2006 development, see C.F Bergström, Comitology: 
Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (OUP, 2005). 
11  See K. Lenaerts and A. Verhoeven, ‘Institutional Balance and Democracy’, in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse, Good 
Goverance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002), p. 76. See also K. Lenaerts  and A. Verhoeven, ‘Towards a Legal 
Framework For Executive Rule-making in the EU? The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision’, C.M.L.Rev. 
(2000) 645, at p. 653. 
12  The interaction between the Commission and national representatives is mainly characterised by a consensual 
approach, in which the Commission attempts to accommodate Member States’ interests as far as possible. The co-
operation is therefore conducted mainly in the form of deliberation (C. Joerges and J. Neyer, ‘From Intergovern-
mental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalization of Comitology’, ELJ (1997) 273-299), 
the adoption of implementation acts is further reduced by its obligation, in certain cases, to secure 
the participation of affected third parties and must take account of their opinions.13 Further, the 
Commission must increasingly ensure that scientific expertise is integrated in the adoption of 
implementing measures.14 In reality, the Commission does not only have to act as decision-maker, 
but also as manager of formal and informal networks existing of Member State representations 
experts and private parties.15 The financial services sector has recently adapted the comitology 
process to suit its new approach to law-making and implementation in a cooperative procedure with 
Member State representation.16 The Financial Services Action Plan17 which set out an ambitious 
reform package to achieve a more integrated European capital market required for its 
implementation a new law-making structure. The first acts,18 adopted in accordance with the 
Lamfalussy approach and the Commission, have led to the adoption of several implementing 
measures.19 Even though the system is relatively new, the Lamfalussy approach has been extended 
beyond the securities market to the banking, insurance and investment funds sectors.20 Similar to the 
matter of comitology, the recent growth in EU agencies does not so much constitute a move towards 
a federal executive on the European level, but shows all the characteristics of multilevel 
                                                                                                                                                 
although interest bargaining is not excluded. For a more general overview over the comitology discussion see e.g. ; M. 
Andenas and A. Türk (eds.), Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC (Kluwer, 2000); C. Joerges and J. 
Falke (eds.), Das Ausschusswesen der Europäischen Union (Nomos Baden-Baden, 2000); C. Joerges and E. Vos, EU 
Committees: social regulation, law and politics, (OUP 1999); K. Lenaerts and A. Verhoeven, 'Towards a Legal Framework for 
Executive Rule-Making in the EU? The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision', 37 CMLRev (2000) 645-686; R. Pedler 
and G. Schaefer (eds.), 'Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process' 
(EIPA, Maastricht 1996). 
13  In competition cases e.g., see Article 7(2) of Council Regulation 1/2003, [2003] OJ L 1/1.  
14  This is a requirement under the case law of the ECJ and CFI, see e.g. C-212/91 Angelopharm v Hamburg [1994] ECR I-
171 and T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] ECR II-3495. 
15  See C. Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (OUP, 2002), at p. 182. 
16  See e.g. R. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, 10 Columbia Journal 
of European Law (2004), 49; N. Moloney, ‘The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A New Era for the EC Securities and 
Investment Services Regime’, 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2003) 509-520. 
17  COM(1999) 232. 
18  See Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), [2003] OJ L96/16; Directive 
2003/71 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, [2003] OJ 
L 345/64; Directive 2004/39 on markets in financial instruments, [2004] OJ L 145/1. 
19  See Directive 2003/124, [2003] OJ 339/70 and Directive 2003/125, [2003] OJ L 339/73 and Regulation 2273/2003, 
[2003] OJ L336/37. 
20  See Commission Proposal for a Directive to establish a new financial services committee organisational structure, 
COM(2003)0659 final. The proposal suggests the establishment of two new comitology committees, the European 
Banking Committee (EBC) for the banking sector and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Committee (EIOPC), which would assist the Commission in the implementation of legislative acts. These committees 
would be supplemented by two new advisory committees, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), which the 
Commission has already set up. The UCITS functions would be transferred to the ESC and CESR committees. The 
EP approved the proposal at its first reading on 31 March 2004. The Council agreed at its 2580th meeting (Economic 
and Financial Affairs) on 11 May 2004. 
administrative interaction.21 Agencies have been created in several phases to deal with an increase in 
regulatory activity at Community level. European agencies are decentralised forms of administration 
that integrate national administrative bodies into their operation by providing structures for co-
operation between the supranational and national level and between the national authorities.22 
Agencies often pursue their tasks within a wider administrative setting23 that includes other patterns 
of EU implementation, such as comitology. European agencies are therefore separate, but auxiliary to 
the Commission’s implementing tasks.24 Their auxiliary function, their more limited decision-making 
power and their linkage with national administrations, distinguish European agencies from their US 
counterparts.25 Although in some respects they conform to the ‘network’ concept that has emerged 
in political science, European agencies differ in other important respects from this concept, as they 
are not designed to create a non-hierarchical link with private actors, but provide a channel for the 
input of different public actors.26 The Member States and the Commission can exercise control over 
the agencies through the management board, in which they are generally represented and which 
provides annual reports of the agency’s work.27 Finally, less formal structures of administrative 
interaction in the implementation phase are established in the form of administrative networks. 
Administrative networks, that have been created and adapted to the needs of each policy area, gather 
information, organize planning or co-ordinate the enforcement of Community law. They integrate 
the supranational and national administrative bodies within a structure designed to conduct joint or 
co-ordinated implementing action. Also, where implementation tasks are entrusted to private bodies, 
such as in the field of European standardization, the relevant national actors are integrated into a 
supranational framework. In this sense, the administrative networks encompass various forms of 
cooperation both in the ‘vertical’ relation between the European Commission and agencies on one 
hand and the Member States’ agencies on the other, as well as the ‘horizontal’ cooperation directly 
                                                 
21  Agencies integrate national and supranational actors into a unitary administrative structure and mostly operate within 
a wider administrative framework in which they pursue specific functions. See: T. Groß, ‚Die Kooperation zwischen 
europäischen Agenturen und nationalen Behörden’, Europarecht (2005) 54-68. 
22  On the decentralised integration model, see E. Chitti ‘Decentralisation and Integration into the Community 
Administrations: A New Perspective on European Agencies’, 10 ELJ (2004), pp. 423-431; D. Geradin and N. Petit, 
‘The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform’, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 01/04, 33 (www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040101.pdf). 
23  E. Chiti, ‘Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New Perspective on European 
Agencies’, 10 ELJ (2004), p. 419. 
24  E. Chiti, ‘Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New Perspective on European 
Agencies’, 10 ELJ (2004), 419-423 at p. 419. 
25  E. Chiti, ‘Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New Perspective on European 
Agencies’, 10 ELJ (2004), 429-430 at p. 419. 
26  E. Chiti, ‘Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New Perspective on European 
Agencies’, 10 ELJ (2004), p. 419, at pp. 425-428 
27  Exceptions to this model exist most notably in the structure of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (Council Regulation 1035/97, [1997] OJ L 151/1) and the European Food Safety Agency (Regulation 
178/2002 of the European Parliament and Council, [2002] OJ L 31/1). 
between different national agencies. These vertical and horizontal relations in practice consist of 
obligations of different intensity. They range from obligations to exchange information either on an 
ad-hoc or on a permanent basis. A more intense form is the obligation to assist other administrations 
by providing administrative support or joint planning.  Finally, they can reach as far as using Member 
States administrations as types of EU agencies, where the EU level decides on the type and scope of 
activities to be undertaken in individual cases on the national level in single cases.28 
Such network structures which regulate vertical as well as horizontal relations between actors at 
national and EU levels have as their task the effective enforcement of Community rules by 
integrating national regulators into a Community framework.29 Such formalised administrative 
network structures function with or in addition to the comitology and Lamfalussy system and the 
establishment of agencies. They supplement the executive position of the Commission in the 
implementation of Community law.30 Network structures can play a role both when it comes to the 
preparation for the conditions of implementation of EU policies through individual administrative 
decisions as well as in the decision-making process itself. An example of the former are networks 
created to structure information. Another category are the increasingly common joint planning 
structures in Europe, in which EU law organises the Commission (and sometimes European 
agencies) together with national agencies into ‘planning networks’.31 In other policy areas, the 
network structures have been developed to include forms of implementation which will include 
individually binding decisions such as the ‘enforcement networks’ in the area of competition law 
enforcement.32 Finally, there are forms of implementation which, on the face look like traditional, 
decentralised implementation by Member State administrations. As a result of the influence of EU 
law, they have however developed specific forms of administrative activity which are no longer 
limited to the territory of a Member State. This form of network effect can be referred to as ‘trans-
                                                 
28  For further analysis see E. Schmidt-Assmann, ‘Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund  und die Rolle des 
Verwaltungsrechts’ in: Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann, Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.) Der Europäische 
Verwaltungsverbund Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen 2005) 1-23 and the contributions in E. Schmidt-Assmann, W. Hoffmann-
Riem (eds.), Strukturen des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts Nomos (Baden-Baden 1999). 
29  See the ‘European Regulators Group’ in the telecommunications sector (Decision 2002/627), the ‘Committee of 
European Securities Regulators’ in the financial services sector (Decision 2001/527 [2001] OJ L191/43) and the 
‘European Competition Network’ (Council Regulation 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1). 
30  Further types of measures have been established for example with respect to the ‚open method of cooperation’. Here 
the Council decides on guidelines and establishes, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks - see No 37 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council on 23 and 24 March 2000, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/lis1_en.htm#c). 
31  A prominent example of such a network is the ‘European Information Observation Network’, ‘Eionet’ (Council 
Regulation 1210/90 of 7 May 1990, OJ 1990 L 120/1 and Council Regulation 933/99 of 29 April 1999, OJ 1999 L 
117/1, amending Regulation 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European 
environment information and observation network). See for further reference: G. Sydow, ‘Strukturen europäischer 
Planungsverfahren’, 56 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (2003), pp. 605-613. 
32  See: Council Regulation 1/2003, [2003] OJ L 1/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
territorial’ effect of administrative activity. It results from administrative acts by national 
administrations which have effect outside of their own jurisdiction born from obligations of mutual 
recognition of administrative acts. This is necessary, for instance, to coordinate the administration of 
the single market by different national authorities. 
European integration has therefore developed over time very much driven through the establishment 
of a network of integrated executives for the creation and implementation of matters within the 
sphere of EU law. This system of procedural integration of executives covers both the areas 
traditionally reviewed from the constitutional as well as from the administrative perspective. It 
however, is not always visible from the outside because they are generally procedural preparation for 
final administrative or legislative decisions either on the Member State or the EU level. Rules and 
principles governing the cooperation have often not only been provided for in the Treaties, more 
often they have evolved out of institutional practice.33 This difference between the formal order of 
the EU and the reality amounts to an organisational ‘gap.’ The gap exists between the reality of actors 
involved in creating and implementing EU policies in comparison to the procedures and institutions 
to be found when reading the (already complex forms of act and procedures provided by the) 
founding Treaties.34 A challenge to EU public law theory exists in developing approaches that take 
into account both the open and the hidden realities. Such ‘realist’ understanding might be referred to 
as the material constitution of the EU. 
This organisational gap leads also to an ‘accountability gap.’ The latter gap arises due to different 
degrees of integration between what in a traditional separation of powers system would be referred 
to as the legislative, executive and judicial powers. On the European level, the high degree of 
integration of executive powers is often not matched by an equal level of integration of legislative 
and judicial powers. This leads to imbalances and problems with supervision and control of the 
executive. It is a consequence which has been deplored with respect to Member States executives 
becoming more powerful vis-à-vis their national parliaments due to the possibility of escaping 
political accountability at home by engaging in EU level rule-making.35 This problem has been 
addressed by strengthening of the EP and effective judicial control of EU law in the ECJ. However, 
                                                 
33  Cite 11/70 Köster und aus ELJ Topology article discussion of using institutional practice for arguing in favour of 
amending Treaty provisions. 
34  At the origin of this word-play seems to be Deirdre Curtin with various publications e.g. D. Curtin, Mind the Gap: the 
Evolving EU Executive and the Constitution, Walter van Gerven Lectures, Europa Law Publishing (Groningen 2004). 
35  This is generally explained by the fact that conferral of powers from the national to the supranational sphere often 
affect or even undermine the separation of powers typically established within a state. Since it is generally the 
exectutive branch of government representing the state towards the outside, this branch of government gains powers 
through participation in the exercise of this power on the supranational level which nationally would have remained 
with the legislature. See with further considerations for the consequences of delegation e.g. D. Sarooshi, International 
Organisations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, Oxford University Press (Oxford 2005) 15. 
the important difference between an integrated executive and the accountability systems are that on 
one hand, there is an integrated executive cooperating closely in agenda setting, policy making and 
policy implementation. Integration has become so intense that it is often not possible to discern the 
locus of responsibility for the final outcome. On the other hand, there is a two-level reality of 
political (parliamentary) and judicial supervision and control of executive actors. This results in 
structural imbalances for effective accountability. The accountability gap therefore arises between the 
extent and intensity of executive integration in reality and the capabilities of control and supervision 
of executive actors. 
This has consequences not only for our understanding of the role of the EU/EC and the Member 
States in Europe but also for the analysis of key aspects such as accountability of exercising public 
powers in Europe. The latter aspect is the key challenge arising from this integration. The question 
therefore is whether, in view of the evolution of integrated executives, forms of accountability have 
equally been created. It is not a given that the accountability structures would automatically appear in 
comparable time and speed. Not least because the highly integrated network system has been 
developed in a non-coordinated approach through experimentalist approaches pioneered in 
individual policy areas.  
The challenges EU public law faces is to align various options of ex ante and ex post modes of control 
and supervision from executive, parliamentary and judicial forms to allow for both transparent and 
effective exercise of public powers.36 
 
Integrated Executives 
 
A more in-depth look at accountability structures for integrated executives action in formal and 
informal both legislative and administrative-type activities confirms this gap. The actors belonging to 
the European or Member State executives acting in the networks are inter alia subject to a system of 
checks and balances from within the integrated executive. Such forms include, hierarchical and non-
hierarchical arrangements. ‘Internal’ supervision of executive activities from within the executive 
networks can be divided into a number of areas of focus.37 They take into account various multi-
level, network and composite elements and their associated complexities and include:  
                                                 
36  Above, in the chapter re-thinking the challenges arising from administrative law, it was found that accountability can 
be considered from three different perspectives aligned to the classical separation of powers as executive supervision, 
political (parliamentary) supervision and judicial supervision. 
37  The complexity of these mechanisms is best illustrated by the in-depth discussion by G. C. Rowe, Administrative 
Accountability of Executives, 15 Administrative Law Review [2009 forthcoming]. 
• internal supervision within the Commission (e.g. through institutions so diverse as the need 
for collegiate decisions in the Commission, the role of the Hearing Officer in certain 
administrative procedures or the role of OLAF as internal control organ);  
• hierarchical supervision of European executive and regulatory agencies by the Commission 
for Community agencies and by the Council for Union agencies;  
• supervision exercised by specialised and independent authorities within the EU and vis-à-vis 
Member State actors. These include actors such as OLAF, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor, the Ombudsman (although this actor is linked to the EP, one might regard him 
as part of parliamentary supervision);   
• supervision by the Commission of Member State executives for example in the area of 
implementation of EU policies or in the area of state aids;  
• scrutiny by Member State executives of Commission action especially in Comitology 
committee settings (with possibilities of recourse to the Council) and expert groups. Also 
supervision by Member State executives of agencies through membership in supervisory 
bodies;   
• involvement of Member State executives in Council working groups; 
• ‘inter-state’ supervision between Member States, that is, supervision of measures of one 
Member State by the administration of another Member State (for example, in the fields of 
bank, insurance and securities regulation) as well as with respect to maintaining the 
correctness of information in information networks (e.g. SIS II data correction possibilities) 
and by means of the very rare Article 227 EC procedure;  
• supervision internal to the administrations of the Member States within fields of EU action; 
supervision of sub-national and municipal authorities within the Member States e.g. in the area 
of public procurement and state aids but also the use of structural funds; 
• supervision within composite procedures of input from other members of an administrative 
network. 
• supervision of executive action by private parties involved in procedures, e.g. by lobbyists in 
legislative and rule-making procedures and e.g. complainants in single-case administrative 
procedures. 
• supervision of executive action by the wider public through access to information 
possibilities.   
Looking at this long yet necessarily only indicative list of options, it becomes apparent that executive 
supervision and control takes place in an integrated manner when it comes to executive functions 
generally undertaken in network structures. Challenges exist in respect to transparency and allocation 
of responsibility in networks.  
This picture is quite different from parliamentary and judicial forms of supervision, which may 
illustrates the accountability gap. That gap arises from the difference between these intricate network 
control and supervision structures of integrated executives in comparison to the possibilities of a 
two-level set-up of parliamentary and judicial control and supervision structures.   
 
Two-Level Parliaments 
 
Parliamentary supervision can but does not have to rely on formal remedial elements or competences 
to generate binding results. Supervision by parliaments can also rely more on forcing the publication 
of information, and voting strength. This will lead to the passing of motions and questioning of  
individuals. More formal powers include the appointment of individuals to positions of 
responsibility, allocation of budgets and delegation of powers through legislation. The forms of 
parliamentary supervision in the EU exist either on the European or the Member State level. The 
parliaments are integrated only to a very limited degree, generally maintaining a strict two-level 
structure: The EP supervises and controls activities on the European level undertaken by EU actors; 
The Member States’ national (and where relevant sub-national parliaments) control national 
governments in their exercise of powers within the executive networks and in Council. The 
difficulties for a two-level parliamentary supervision in view of a highly integrated executive are the 
very difficulty of allocating responsibilities in executive network structures. Networks are generally 
designed to produce effective results but render the allocation of responsibilities problematic, often 
due to a lack of transparency of the roles of individual actors. One possible remedy to this problem 
might be to also integrate parliamentary supervision and control procedures. However, in reality the 
existing forms of parliamentary cooperation are much less developed than those of executive 
cooperation. Cooperate approaches, 
• National parliaments’ possibility to cooperate amongst each others and with the EP. A 
forum for such cooperation has been created by members of the European affairs 
committees of the national parliaments and MEPs who regularly hold meetings in the 
framework of ‘The Conference of European Affairs Committees’ (COSAC). COSAC 
meetings not only serve to exchange information, they also serve to coordinate efforts of 
political supervision by concerted action between the parliaments.38 COSAC will continue to 
be an important forum for parliamentary exchange about methodology and substance of 
parliamentary supervision of executive activities.39 
• The Treaty of Lisbon also occasionally provides for direct involvement of national 
parliaments in supervision of European agencies and their administrative activities. Articles 
85 (1)(b) and 88 (2)(b)TFEU, for example, require legislative acts to lay down the procedures 
for ‘the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities’ and ‘for scrutiny of Europol’s activities’ by the EP 
and national Parliaments. 
• Also provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon is the possibility of Article 12 TEU, MS 
parliaments by review of compliance of legislative proposals with the principle of subsidiarity  
• European political parties, so far only marginally organised, could help to reinforce political 
networks also within parliaments. 
• Informally the work of the EP’s Ombudsman is supported by the activities of the national 
and regional ombudsmen in the Member States, organized in a ‘European Network of 
Ombudsmen.’ This serves to provide mutual support and exchange of views. The network 
was established in order to address potential lacunae in the Ombudsman’s supervision of 
administrative activity.40 The idea is to be able to transfer complaints between the European 
and the relevant national and regional ombudsmen. Thereby complaints should be 
automatically handled by the ombudsman in charge of the administration being the source of 
alleged maladministration. However, the strict organic distinction of competences also 
within the network of ombudsmen can lead to difficult situations in composite 
administrative procedures. To address these problems a special procedure was developed 
through which national or regional ombudsmen may ask for written answers to queries 
about EU law, its interpretation and its application to special cases from the EO. The EO 
either provides the answer directly or, if appropriate, channels the query to another EU 
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Matthieu, La COSAC, une instance européenne a la croisée des chemins, [2005] Revue du Droit de l'Union 
européenne 343 – 362; K. Pöhle ‘Das Demokratiedefizit der EU und die nationalen Parlamente’ (1998) 29 Zeitschrift für 
Parlamentsfragen 77-89; J. Rideau ‘National Parliaments and the European Parliament - Cooperation and Conflict’ in 
Eivind Smith (ed.) National Parliaments as Cornerstones of European Integration (London, Den Haag, Boston 1996) 159-178. 
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institution.41 Cooperation between the Ombudsman and similar authorities and authorities 
concerned with protection of fundamental rights in the Member States is permitted in 
accordance with the relevant national law. 
This said however, the network characteristics of executive integration in the EU do not facilitate 
effective parliamentary supervision organised either on the Member State or on the European level. 
The intense executive cooperation for the creation and implementation of law is a fast-paced activity, 
in which responsibilities are often distributed amongst many different actors. 
 
Two-Level Judiciary 
 
Judicial supervision of action of the integrated executive as well as the various legislative bodies in 
the EU is undertaken either by Courts on the Member State level or on the EU level. Judicial review 
of actions at first view seems well linked. Maduro for example explains the success of European 
integration as being based on the concept of supremacy and direct effect at least in part by the ECJ 
having developed an elaborate system of cooperation between Courts. He finds that  
‘The ECJ is the highest court of this legal system and therefore enjoys the monopoly of 
interpretation of the rules. But the success of this process of creation of a European legal order 
was only possible because the Court looked for and found the cooperation of different national 
legal actors. For this, it also had to ‘negotiate’ with those actors, in particular, but not only, with 
national courts.’42 
Many important cases of the ECJ’s history reached the ECJ as references for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 234 EC. This preliminary reference procedure, which can be requested by any national 
Court assured that the relations between the Courts were non-hierarchic in so far as national law 
could not – against the explicit wording of Article 234 EC - request the exhaustion of national 
remedies prior to a request for preliminary ruling by the ECJ. The result is a system in which the 
national judge is also a Community judge and supremacy of Community law does not imply 
inferiority of national Courts.  
However, equally characteristic of the preliminary reference procedure is that the ECJ only decides 
the Community law aspects of cases. The final decision of the case rests with a national judge. Also, 
in some dimensions, individuals were put on the same level as Member States. Individuals were 
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empowered by Article 234 EC in combination with the principles of supremacy and direct effect to 
enforce Community law and to request the review of the compliance of national provisions with 
Community law. 
Problems with this cooperation in view of integrated executives arise from the fact that the 
cooperation structures provided through Article 234 EC are a one-way street only. They only allow 
for vertical cooperation initiated by national courts. Other dimensions of a network such as vertical 
cooperation initiated by the ECJ or horizontal cooperation between Courts are not provided for. The 
latter might be particularly helpful in the context of judicial review of the increasing amount of 
composite procedures in the areas of implementation of policies and executive rule-making. 
 
The Two Gaps - Consequences 
 
Judicial and parliamentary integration are far less developed than executive integration. For 
accountability of the system this has consequences. Integrated executives function through the 
notion of strong procedural cooperation in various forms of networks. This organisational element is 
only marginal for the work of parliaments and judicial review. Procedurally they act separately. There 
is thus a gap between the forms of organisation of activities and their major accountability 
mechanisms. Accountability and supervision mechanisms, especially possibilities of judicial review 
mostly follow the traditional pattern of a two-level system with distinct national and European levels 
much more closely than the executive bodies. Such traditionally organised supervisory structures face 
difficulties in allocating responsibility for errors during the procedures and finding adequate remedies 
for poor performance within a network. They also have difficulties coping with the fact that the 
substance of executive cooperation in composite procedures is the joint gathering and subsequent 
sharing of information.  
Legal realists will acknowledge these facts as part of their review of the institutional and procedural 
architecture of the system of EU public law. In absence of strong networks for shared and 
procedurally integrated judicial and parliamentary review, it seems that responsibility for review of all 
forms of action by executives and networks needs to be undertaken. In other words, what is required 
is a clearer recognition of the actual transformations that have taken place within European 
institutional architecture and to adapt the approaches to accountability therein. This requires not only 
transparency in structures, procedures and access to information. It also requires matching ex ante 
and ex post supervision and control structures to the realities of the forms of exercise of public 
powers in the EU. It is not sufficient to cling to a vision of separation of levels when those structures 
in reality would seem very unrealistic in the way the modern system of EU public law is. It seems 
more promising to develop adapted approaches. 
 
Approaching the Future Challenges  
 
From a legal realist’s point of view, the integrated nature of the European legal system is the one of 
its most characteristic defining features. European integration is not so much built on a model of 
clear vertical or horizontal separation of powers. It is built on the basis of shared sovereignty, 
coordinated approaches to joint problem solving and integration of various levels and interests in 
decision-making. The integrated nature and the reduced role of clear separation of powers requires 
careful thinking for maintaining transparency for example with respect to allocation of 
responsibilities for action and accountability of actors. Since most of the network structures in 
European law have developed in an evolutionary, trial and error fashion, often in single policy areas, 
transparency might require clarification and systematisation of procedures. This was the approach 
chosen for many years with respect to Comitology procedures which had developed out of 
institutional practice and necessity. It can be repeated with respect to other problems of European 
governance. The Treaty of Lisbon is a step in that direction by leading to a certain degree of 
harmonisation throughout the former pillar structure. Its proposed typology of acts and procedures 
however is far from a simplification and might not make all that much of a difference in reality. 
Looking at a systematisation of approaches and clarification of accountability mechanisms has often 
loosely be termed ‘constitutionalisation.’43 What is necessary in my view is to develop a ‘network 
constitution’ to address the different network integration problems. Such would not have to be a 
formal constitutional treaty or even a treaty amendment. A material constitution establishing rules 
and principles through case law, general principles and common accords for addressing real problems 
of a networked and integrated legal order might suffice. Such ‘network constitution’ will thus be 
specifically a process-oriented material constitution of the EU. In establishing these basic 
constitutional provisions, it is however necessary not stand paralysed and frozen in an outdated 
conceptional fiction of a two-level legal system in which powers and competences can be neatly 
distinguished and kept apart. The reality is marked by fading borders and clear limitations between 
public and private, international, supranational, national and sub-national. This in turn reduces the 
importance within the EU of notions of territorial reach of public law, and sovereignty as a concept 
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of something which needs to be protected against encroachments from the ‘outside’. Instead the 
search can be for the best political solution to a problem and the best procedural mix of actors 
involved for the task at hand. This will not be the end of separate actors such as the Member States. 
It instead argues more for a lawyers’ focus on framing conditions for transparency and accountability 
in joint and composite procedures created to realistically reach public goals for which joint action is 
necessary.  
A network constitution as material constitution therefore does not replace the Treaties or in any way 
encroach on their scope of applicability. It would instead be a collection of concepts, rules and 
principles established to address network issues arising from the reality of the EU legal system. Some 
elements for a network constitution exist of course. These are concepts that inter alia address 
requirements within network situations. They include rights and obligations in the area of access to 
information, obligations of justification, principles of good administration, rules on delegation and 
supervision of delegated powers, principles of law such as proportionality and others more. Other 
attempts at establishing elements of constitutionalising a network system have been much less of a 
success. This can for example be seen in the Treaty of Lisbon’s models for linking the European and 
national levels in rule-making and policy implementation. Here, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for a 
two different procedures in Article 290 TFEU on delegated acts and Article 291 TFEU on 
implementing acts. The parallel existence of both categories raises the question of why to 
differentiate between the two categories of sub-legislative act?44 The differentiation shows that the 
problem of the distinction between delegated acts and implementing acts needs to be seen in view of 
differing conceptions of multi-levelism consistent in the EU. A more federal-style model would 
follow an approach of distinguishing clearly between a two-level structure with the Member States on 
one level and the EU as quasi-federal structure on the other. The Treaty of Lisbon’s strengthening of 
executive federalism by legal definitions in Articles 290 and 291 FEU, however, runs fundamentally 
counter to the developments in reality of an ever more integrating legal system in the EU. The EU is 
thus in reality characterised by its multi-level cooperative structures, designed to include the different 
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decision-making levels and generate knowledge in the administrative system prior to taking 
decisions.45 
Such considerations as to a network constitution might be well accompanied by establishing best 
practice approaches in EU administrative sphere.46 So far in the reality of EU law, there is often a 
growing gap between the prolific creation of new forms of administrative action in the EU and their 
regulatory framework and embedding in various control and legitimacy mechanisms. EU legislation 
has been a true laboratory of experimental institutional and procedural design. This richness however 
has led to an overburdening complexity of often overlapping rules and principles. It can lead to a lack 
of transparency, predictability, intelligibility and trust in European administrative and regulatory 
procedures and their outcome. One of the key issues to be addressed in this context is the great 
potential but also need for simplification. A creation of a best-practice approach might thus serve to 
improve visibility, transparency, allocation of responsibility and accountability of administrative and 
more generally executive action in the EU.  
These attempts should contribute to addressing the issue of public accountability. It seems important 
though to me to stress that such accountability can not be established by internal checks and balances 
within a system of integrated executives alone, as important as these internal structures may be. Also 
the parliamentary and party political aspects as well as the judicial aspects are important. On the 
European level, there is often not so much a deficit of democracy and representation of interests as a 
deficit of truly political debate. Politicising the policy choices made in the integrated legal system is an 
important part of parliamentary supervision and control of executive action in networks.  
The review of EU public law both from what generally might be viewed as a constitutional and an 
administrative point of view therefore has shown us that in many cases first appearances in EU law 
might be false. An attempt to frame a legal system along constitutional understanding well familiar to 
a scholar of, for example, a federal constitutional model risks not creating legal structures adapted to 
addressing the challenges which the legal system of EU law. The challenge is to develop of network 
accountability by constitutionalising networks that fit the specific nature of the EU. That is defined 
by its nature of exercising shared sovereignty by integrated executives and the ensuing network 
character of an increasing amount of actors and procedures in policy areas. The normative challenge 
for lawyers in EU public law is to develop the transparency, accountability structures from all sides. 
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